We investigate loan price in mergers and acquisitions (M&As), using hand-matched loan information for a sample of 512 U.S. M&A transactions. We find the relative size of a deal constitutes a prominent determinant of the loan price measured by the all-in-drawn spread (AIDS). This result is robust to several specifications that address endogeneity concerns. Further analysis demonstrates higher AIDS is associated with lower post-transaction performance. We posit that deal size is a major concern for lenders because it involves greater information risk, greater business complexity, and more integration difficulties. Further, the loan price correctly factors in the risk of poor post-transaction performance.
1 Introduction them to screen and monitor effectively (Bharadwaj and Shivdasani, 2003; Diamond, 1984) . Strahan (1999) postulates that lenders use price to compensate themselves for taking the risks that are hard to contract on. He suggests that loan price is a sufficient statistic of the borrower's post-contract performance which involves too many uncertainties for a complete contract (see Grossman and Hart, 1983; Hart, 2017; Hart and Moore, 1990 , for the idea of contract incompleteness). Indeed, we find higher loan price is associated with significantly worse performance in the post-acquisition years. This finding is consistent for performance measures based on stock prices and those based on accounting information.
We contribute to two strands of literature. First, we examine the loan financing cost of merger transactions. Financing is a prime issue in M&A transaction, as important as valuation. The cost of loan financing impacts the potential of merger gains directly. Previous literature, however, focuses on the determinants or consequences of the means of payment (e.g., Faccio and Masulis (2005) , among others). There are only a few papers that broach the financing issues of M&A transactions. Schlingemann (2004) finds that the sources of finance impact the cross-section of bidder announcement returns significantly. Martynova and Renneboog (2009) and Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003) find that the bidders using more debt to finance their cash offers can obtain higher gains. Martynova and Renneboog (2009) also examine the determinants of debt financing likelihood in a sample of European M&A transactions. Vladimirov (2015) analyzes how the cost and source of finance in cash offers impact acquisition premium and acquisition outcome when acquirers face financial frictions. Differing from these previous studies, we investigate how the characteristics of M&A deals determine the cost of loan financing. Our results show that the relative deal size is the primary factor that persistently impacts loan price. This finding is in line with the view of Alexandridis et al. (2013) that deal size summarizes the observed and unobserved complexity of a transaction that impact shareholder value negatively. Second, we contribute to the literature on loan pricing by demonstrating that the features of major corporate investment determine the loan price. Extant studies have emphasized the relationship between lenders and borrowers (Bharath et al., 2011; Boot, 2000) , the relation among syndication partners (Ivashina, 2009) , the borrower's organizational structure (Aivazian et al., 2015) , and the accounting quality of the borrowing firms (Bharath et al., 2008) . These studies treat loans by the same borrower as homogeneous across different purposes. We find that, for major corporate investments like M&As, the transaction characteristics also impact loan prices, after controlling all the determinants highlighted in the previous literature. In merger transactions, the risks associated with the scale of the transaction is a first-order concern.
Third, we find evidence consistent with the view that loan price is a sufficient statistics for the borrower's post-acquisition performance (Strahan, 1999) . This finding is in line with a broader literature that argues lenders have the information advantage required to screen and monitor borrowers (Bharadwaj and Shivdasani, 2003; Diamond, 1984) .
We organize the remainder of this paper as follows. Section 2 describes the data sampling procedure. Section 3 describes the variables and the econometric specification of our analysis.
Section 4 reports and discusses our results. Section 5 concludes.
Data and Sample

Sample selection
We obtain an initial M&A sample from the SDC M&A database. We keep both completed and withdrawn deals announced in the U.S. during 1994 and 2017. The reason for choosing 1994 to begin with is that the SEC online filings of listed companies begin in 1994, allowing us to access 8-K filings to manually verify whether an M&A transaction is indeed funded by loans. In our sample, the acquiring firms are public, but the target firms can be public, private or subsidiary firms. This initial sample contains 20282 transactions. Additionally, the records of M&A deals should have non-missing values of the means of payment, announcement and effective dates, and transaction value. To identify the sample of loanfinanced M&As, we impose several criteria. First, we drop those M&As deals where we cannot find the acquiring firm's GVKEY from Compustat. We need the GVKEY to retrieve data from Compustat and CRSP to calculate necessary control variables based on acquirer characteristics. Second, we drop those M&A deals without any cash in the consideration because an acquiring firm does not need to borrow to fund a pure-stock transaction (we keep them for the Heckman procedure in Section 4.4 and Appendix II, however). Third, we exclude transactions where the acquirers are in the utilities (SIC code 4900-4999) or financial industry(SIC code 6000-6999). Fourth, we keep those M&A deals indicated by SDC as being funded by borrowing, bridge loans, or lines of credit. After these criteria, we have 1312 M&A transactions potentially financed by loans. To confirm a transaction is indeed loan financed, we rely on 8-K filings. We retrieve 8-K documents filed between the deal announcement date and the third month after the deal effective date. We then search through all the retrieved 8-K filings to find out which 8-K files are about M&A transactions.
We retrieve the data on loan facilities from Thomson Reuters DealScan.
4 A loan contract (called a loan package in Dealscan), contains one or more loan facilities. The loan facilities within the same package may contain different prices, and non-price terms, and their purposes may also differ. In a syndicated loan contract, the lender(s) may also be different across facilities. Dealscan provides information on a variety of loan terms, on the role of lenders (e.g., leading or participating banks in a syndicated loan), and on basic characteristics of borrowers.
Matching loan facilities to acquiring firms
We follow two steps to match Dealscan loan facilities to our sample of potentially loanfinanced deals. The first step involves matching borrowers from Dealscan to our sample acquirers. The second step involves selecting the facilities used for a M&A transaction from all the facilities ever initiated by a borrower/acquirer.
Dealscan does not have a firm ID (e.g., GVKEY) that can be used to match the borrowers to the acquiring firms covered by SDC, or to the data provided by Compustat or CRSP. Chava and Roberts (2008) construct a Compustat-Dealscan linkage file covering the period from January 1983 to August 2017. We use this linkage file, together with the GVKEY-CUSIP link file from CRSP, to match borrowers to acquiring firms. Once this is done, for each acquiring firm, we have all the loan facilities it has ever taken. In the second step, from all the loan facilities ever taken by an acquiring firm, we find the loan facilities specifically used for a particular M&A transaction.
To do this, we read through the M&A-related 8-K filings selected earlier containing information about financing sources. The information on sources of finance are disclosed in sections titled "Item 1. We use the All-in-drawn spread (AIDS) from Dealscan to measure loan price. Dealscan defines AIDS as "the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down. It adds the spread of the loan with an annual (or facility) fee paid to the bank group". In other words, AIDS includes all monetary costs of a loan facility. A M&A transaction may be funded by several loan facilities, and we use the average AIDS across facilities for subsequent analysis. The arithmetic average AIDS and the weighted average AIDS (weighted by the amount of each facility) give the same qualitative results. For brevity, we only report the results based on the weighted average AIDS (henceforth AIDS for simplicity). The results based on the arithmetic average AIDS are available upon request.
B Relative deal size
We calculate the relative deal size as the ratio of transaction value to the acquiring firm's market value of equity measured at the end of last fiscal year relative to deal announcement.
We also use the ratio of the transaction value to the acquirer's book value of total assets at the end of the last fiscal year and obtain qualitatively the same results(unreported but available upon request). 
Control variables for our loan-price regression analysis
We include several deal characteristics that potentially relate to various risks associated with a transaction. Our interests here are twofold: 1) to examine whether any of these variables capture risk-related effects on M&A loan price additional to that captured by the relative deal size and 2) to ensure the effect of relative deal size is robust to controlling for the effects of these variables. First, we use a dummy variable to indicate whether a M&A transaction is a diversifying deal (equals 1) or not (equals 0). We include this variable because Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) posit that a diversifying deal may reflect managerial motive and involves agency risk. We define a deal as diversifying if the acquiring and the target firm are from two different 2-digit SIC code industries. Second, we control for the target's public status by adding two dummy variables: one dummy variable is 1 for public targets and 0 otherwise, and the other is 1 for subsidiary firms and 0 otherwise. These variables are included according to the previous literature. Specifically , Officer, Poulsen, and Stegemoller (2008) Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) postulate that the acquisitions of company assets (including subsidiaries) enhance acquirer performance, which may, in turn, enhance loan quality. Third, we control for deal attitude by including a dummy variable for hostility
(1 for hostile mergers and 0 otherwise), because target resistance either pushes up offer price in the interest of target shareholders or entrench the target management at the expense of shareholders (Baron, 1983; Schwert, 2000) . Forth, an international setting is far more complex than a domestic one, and it is more difficult to coordinate actions and monitor managers across boarders (Denis, Denis, and Yost, 2002) . We control for a cross-border M&As using a dummy variable (1 for cross-border mergers and 0 otherwise) accordingly.
Fifth, Martynova and Renneboog (2009) posit that the choice of financing sources is related to a bidders' strategic preference for the means of payment. Therefore, we control for a dummy for stock payment (1 if the deal payment contains the bidder's stocks and 0 otherwise). Last, tender offers have a shorter duration and less competition from rival bidders; thus, have less risk of incompletion than negotiated offers. Meanwhile, tender offers lead to higher premium payment and more financial restrictions for the acquirers (Offenberg and Pirinsky, 2015) . Tender offers also relate to better post-transaction performance (Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000; Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker, 1992) . Thus, we further control for a tender offer dummy (1 for tender offers and 0 otherwise).
We also control for several acquiring/borrowing-firm characteristics. We control for the size of the borrowing firm because larger firms are in a better position to serve debt (Faccio and Masulis, 2005; Strahan, 1999) . We measure size using the natural logarithm of the acquiring firm's total assets reported in the fiscal year ending before deal announcement.
Firms with a higher leverage ratio are likely to have less cash to serve debt (Faccio and Masulis, 2005) , potentially increasing loan price. We, therefore, control for the ratio of the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to book value of total assets, measured at the end of the fiscal year before deal announcement. A deal with greater relative size may lead to a greater increase in the acquiring firm's leverage. We, therefore, also control for the change in acquirer leverage in our regression analysis. Borrowing firms with more investment opportunities have a greater demand for bank loans (Martin and Santomero, 1997) . Meanwhile, firms with more growth opportunities are more likely to under-invest when debt overhangs (Myers, 1977) . Thus we control for the acquiring firm's market-tobook ratio of equity. Risk-averse lenders usually desire tangible assets because these assets provide better loan security (Faccio and Masulis, 2005) and are easier to value (Strahan, 1999 ) than intangible assets. Firms can also use tangible assets as collateral to reduce loan risk. Hence we control for the acquiring firm's asset tangibility ratio. We use two variables to control for the acquiring firms' bankruptcy risk (Scott and Smith, 1986) . One is the Altman Z-score (Altman, 1968) . The other is the borrower's credit rating (Lim, Lee, Kausar, and Walker, 2014) . We encode the acquiring firm's S&P long-term credit ratings from 1 to 7 (1 = AAA, 2 = AA, ..., 6 = B or worse, 7 indicates firms without ratings) following Qian and Strahan (2007) .
The third set of variables we control for relate to loan contract characteristics for the M&A transactions. First, we control for the loan size by adding the natural logarithm of the average amount of loan facilities used for a transaction scaled by the sum of the combining firms' total assets. We do this because lenders are more cautious when lending in large amounts, as large loans reduce diversification and increase banking risk (Diamond, 1984) . Second, lenders use financial covenants to protect themselves (Bradley and Roberts, 2015; Rajan and Winton, 1995) . We then add a dummy variable to control for the effects of financial covenants (1 for the inclusion of financial covenants in any of the facilities used for a M&A transaction and 0 otherwise). Third, we add a dummy variable for relationship lending, because Bharath et al. (2011) document that relationship lending lowers loan price by mitigating the information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. This dummy variable is one if the acquiring firm has previously borrowed from the lender(s) in the three 8 years before M&A announcement and 0 otherwise. Fourth, Ivashina (2009) finds syndicated loans involve additional risks due to the information asymmetry among the lead and the participant lender. Thus, we control for this effect by including a dummy variable that is one if one or more of the facilities used for a M&A transaction is from syndication of lenders and zero otherwise. Last, lenders use performance pricing terms to mitigate the risks of adverse selection and moral hazards (Asquith, Beatty, and Weber, 2005) . We control for this effect using a dummy variable that is one if any of the facilities used for a M&A transaction contains performance pricing terms and 0 otherwise. Last, since the default spread between the risky debt and the treasury securities may capture cyclical factors affecting default risk, we control for the default spread in our regressions.
Econometric specifications for the loan-price analysis
We use the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) model for our main analysis, based on the assumption that the loan price and non-price terms (i.e., maturity and the use of collateral) in a M&A transaction are likely to be influenced by unobserved common factors.
For example, about half of the M&A transactions in our sample are funded by more than one loan facilities, and some of these facilities are initiated for multiple purposes aside from funding M&A transactions. These alternative uses of some of these loan facilities are not all disclosed, but they may influence all loan terms.
5 The SUR model allows the error terms of the system of equations to be statistically correlated, capturing the correlations among loan terms due to unmeasured factors. The SUR specification is also used in Aivazian et al. (2015) ; Ge, Kim, and Song (2012) . Some of the previous literature examines the determinants of loan price and non-price terms within the same loan facility, using the simultaneous equation model (SEM), assuming simultaneous and consistent mutual impacts on each other among loan terms (e.g., Aivazian et al., 2015; Bharath et al., 2011 ). Since we investigate loan price at the M&A transaction level instead of the facility level, it is hard to argue the loan terms of one facility impact those terms in other facilities at the same time (although they may be statistically correlated). Moreover, according to Wooldridge (2013, p143 -144) , a SEM specification is most relevant when different equations represents the decision process of different economic agents, and the outcome variables are determined in the equilibrium.
However, the loan terms in our analysis are determined by the same pair of lender and borrower.
In our SUR model, the dependent variables of three equations are AIDS, maturity, and a collateral dummy respectively. Both AIDS and maturity are averaged across the facilities for each deal. The collateral dummy is one if any facility used to fund a M&A transaction is secured by collateral and zero otherwise. The X i (i = 1, 2, 3) is the vector of independent variables for each equation. All dependent variables do not appear on the right-hand side of the equations, but i can be correlated.
The vectors of independent variables are not entirely the same across equations. (Barclay and Smith Jr, 1995; Huang and Shang, 2019) In the maturity equation, we include the natural logarithm of acquiring firm's asset maturity as a unique determinant excluded from other equations. Hart and Moore (1994) postulate that the firm attempts to match its debt maturity to the economic life of the assets. Therefore, the firm's asset maturity affects the choice of maturity of debts, but is unlikely to influence other loan terms. For the collateral equation, we add the industry mean of firm asset tangibility ratio as a unique determinant. The industry mean of firm tangibility ratio in each year is based on Bharath et al. (2011) who posit that borrowers in the industries with more tangible assets are more likely to be required to put up a collateral. Meanwhile, the industry average asset tangibility is hardly of direct relevance for loan price and maturity choice. In each equation, we also control for the characteristics of the acquiring firms, those of the M&A transactions, those of the loan contracts, and industry and year effects. The unique variables included in each equation are most relevant for their corresponding loan terms and bear no obvious impact on other loan terms. Given the loan terms are contracted jointly for a loan facility, we cannot strictly rule out the relevance of these unique variables to other loan terms, which represents a possible caveat in the current SUR specification. In an unreported robustness check, we force the set of determinants to be the same across all three equations and used OLS for estimation. Our results do not change qualitatively. We include the detailed definitions of these control variables in the appendix at the end of this paper.
4 Empirical Analysis 4.1 Sample distribution and summary statistics Table 1 [Insert Table 1 Here] Table 2 Tender offers contribute 26% to the sample. Table 2 also presents the characteristics of acquiring firms and loan contracts. Acquiring firms in our sample, on average, are large or medium firms, with the mean value of total assets reaching 2314.35 million dollars. Acquiring firms' average leverage ratio is 0.26, indicating robust debt capacity. The average acquirer's Altman Z-score is 4.88, reflecting low bankruptcy risks. On average, the market-to-book ratio is 3.50, and EBITDA is 19%
of total sales, showing solid growth and profitability. 28% of total assets of the acquiring firms are tangible assets, and the current assets are about twice of current liabilities. The average credit rating score is 5.99, somewhere between A and A+. In terms of loan-contract characteristics, the average facility amount is 505 million dollars and average maturity is 54.31 months. Sixty percent of the acquiring firms offer collateral to secure loans. And there are 77% of the M&A transactions are funded by loan facilities with financial covenants. Notably, almost all of the M&As are funded by syndicated loans, and this is because M&A transactions are often too large for a single bank to fund.
Regarding acquisition performance, we observe that acquirers under perform the CRSP value-weighted market index by 5% in the three years after transaction. The industryadjusted ROA of an average acquirer is 4% before and 5% after the transaction.
[Insert Table 2 Here] 4.2 Univariate analysis of loan price Table 3 presents the univariate analysis on the (weighted average) AIDS. We examine how AIDS differs between sub-groups divided according to our variables of interest (i.e., the relative deal size) as well as several other M&A characteristics. The AIDS is significantly (at the 1% level) higher for the transactions with larger relative size. Large transactions (with relative deal size greater than the sample mean) have an average AIDS of 228.36 basis points above LIBOR, whereas small transactions (relative deal size is less than the sample mean)
have an average AIDS of 166 basis points above LIBOR, indicating that larger transactions have higher loan price. firm's favorable evaluation of the deal and the ease of completing the deal, which is likely to overweight the concerns of overpaying the target. In our subsequent multivariate analysis, we control for these effects.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
Multivariate analysis of loan price
We report the results of our SUR analysis in et al., 2013; Datta, 1991; Faccio and Masulis, 2005; Hansen, 1987) . It is also in line with the observation of Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) that acquiring firms receive lower gains from large deals, which in turn lower loan quality. This result is robust to the inclusion of industry and year effects.
Several acquiring firms' characteristics and loan-contract characteristics also exhibit significant effects on AIDS. The coefficient on the natural logarithm of the acquiring firm's total assets is significantly (at the 5% level or above) negative in the AIDS regression, consistent with the common observation that large firms have better debt capacity and loan quality.
The acquiring firms with higher leverage have significantly (at the 1% level with z = 7.51) higher AIDS than those with lower leverage, consistent with what Faccio and Masulis (2005) find. The acquiring firms' market-to-book ratio is statistically insignificant. We further note that the tangibility ratio has a negative (−0.333) and significant (at the 5% level) coefficient in the AIDS equation, consistent with the idea that higher asset tangibility relates to better value certainty and debt quality (Faccio and Masulis, 2005; Strahan, 1999) . Lower credit rating indicates greater default risk and, therefore, relates to higher AIDS. Indeed, in the AIDS equation, the credit rating score has a positive (0.069) and significant (at the 1% level) coefficient (recall we encode this score as an inverse measure of creditability). The Altman Z-score does not have a statistically significant coefficient in the AIDS equation. It is possible the credit rating score subsumes the effect of bankruptcy. A larger relative deal size may lead to more loan financing, which increases the acquiring firm's leverage from before to after the transaction. To rule out the possibility that the relative size effect is due to change in leverage, we explicitly control for the change in leverage in the AIDS equation. We notice that the change in leverage indeed significantly increases the loan price (the coefficient is 0.613 and significant at the 1% level (z = 3.66). However, the relative deal size effect is not affected by the inclusion of the change in leverage. We also explicitly control for the amount of loan facilities scaled by acquirer post-transaction total assets. This variable measures the change in acquirer leverage due to the use of loan. The coefficient on this variable, however, is statistically insignificant. It could be that the facility amount impact loan price through the change in leverage, and its effect is subsumed by the later effect.
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The coefficient on relationship lending dummy is statistically insignificant, at odds with the finding of Ivashina and Kovner (2011) . These results suggest M&A transactions considerably alter the risk profile of the acquiring firm, making the effect of relationship lending weak.
The performance pricing dummy has a negative and marginally significant (z = −1.81) coefficient in all specifications. Further, we do not find the loan syndication to have a statistically significant coefficient.
Turning to the deal characteristics (namely the diversify deal dummy, the public target dummy, the subsidiary target dummy, the cross-border deal dummy, the hostile deal dummy, and the tender offer dummy), we do not find any of them has a significant impact. Such absence of effects indicates that these deal characteristics are of secondary concerns for the lenders compared to the relative deal value.
As is expected, the coefficient on ln(1 + interest coverage) is negative (−0.047) and significant at the 1% level (z = 2.61). The coefficient on EBIT DA/Sales is −0.396 and statistically significant at the 10% level, indicating higher acquirer profitability is associated with lower loan price. The coefficient on the current ratio has the expected negative sign (−0.012) but is statistically insignificant.
From columns 2 and 3, we note that the relative deal size has a significantly positive impact on the loan maturity but does not significantly impact the use of collateral(although the sign is as expected). In particular, the relative deal size has a coefficient of 0.078 (significant at the 5% level) in the maturity regression under column 2, and an insignificant coefficient (0.045) in the collateral regression. Other control variables have coefficients largely as predicted.
For example, a higher acquirer pre-transaction leverage ratio or a greater change in the ratio is associated with more frequent use of collateral.
[Insert Table 4 Here] 4.4 Robustness tests Apart from using deal-level data, we also use facility-level data to perform robustness checks. Here, we measure loan-contract characteristics for each facility. We report the results in Table 5 . Column 1 contains OLS estimates, assuming maturity and collateral dummy are predetermined. The coefficient of the relative size ratio is positive (0.105) and statistically significant at the 1% level. We find both maturity and collateral are positively and significantly (at the 1% level) related to AIDS. Loans with longer maturity usually involve greater risks, which pushes up the loan price. The interpretation of the positive association between collateral and loan price has two folds. On the one hand, collateral and higher loan price could be substitutes; on the other, lenders are more likely to ask for collateral to secure riskier loans. The coefficient on collateral reflects the net effect.
In column 2, 3, and 4, we report the estimates of the SUR model at the loan facility level. In the AIDS equation, the relative deal size has a coefficient of 0.122 which is statistically significant at the 1% level (t = 6.30). At the bottom of the table, the Breusch-Pagan χ 2 test statistic indicates significance at the 1% level, rejecting the null hypothesis that the error terms are uncorrelated across equations. This test further confirms that the SUR model is an appropriate specification in our context of analysis.
Since we include only the loan-financed M&A transactions in the sample for loan-price analysis, the self-selection issue (Heckman (1979) ) may bias our estimates. Therefore, we use the Heckman (1979) self-selection model to test the robustness of our results, using data at the M&A level. We report the results in column 5. The execution of the Heckman (1979) model requires a two-step procedure. The first step is to estimate the probability of loan finance (reported in Appendix II). The dependent variable of the second stage is the natural logarithm of the (weighted average) AIDS. All other variables are identical to those in the baseline model except that we also include the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) obtained from the first stage. The Wald tests indicate that the null hypothesis ρ = 0 cannot be rejected at the 10% level, suggesting self-selection is unlikely to affect our results. Consistently, the coefficient on the IMR is statistically insignificant (t = 0.19). The coefficient on the relative deal size is qualitatively the same as in our baseline SUR tests.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
In Table 6 , we further control for several additional variables. Due to data availability, adding these variables reduces our sample size considerably. From a theoretical point of view, however, they may impact the loan price. In particular, we include the target firm's Altman Z-score in column 1 because the target default likelihood may impact loan price for the combined firm. In column 2, we add the offer premium to the regression for the concern that overpayment to the target shareholders may harm post-transaction performance and reduce loan quality. In column 3, we add the acquiring firm's pre-transaction stock return volatility to control for the inherited value uncertainty of the acquirer. In columns 4 and 5, we add the Cohen, and Ferrell, 2008) and the CEO duality measure (Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell, 1997) to explicitly control for the quality of acquirer's corporate governance. We find that the effect of relative deal size persists in all the regressions. The additional variables discussed above has no significant effects on AIDS apart from the acquirer's pre-transaction stock-return volatility. 
Loan price and post-acquisition performance
In Table 7 , we report our estimates on how loan price is associated with post-transaction performance. For the stock-market price performance, we estimate the following regression using OLS,
For the accounting-based performance measure (i.e., ROA), we follow the specification of Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992). Specifically,
, where i indexes M&A transactions. Post Performance is the acquirer performance after the deal completion and Pre Performance is the acquirer performance before the deal announcement. γ measures the extent to which an acquirer's pre-acquisition business persists after the transaction. β and η measure the effect of any explicitly specified variable on acquirer post-transaction performance. α measures the effect of the transaction on acquirer performance aside from those explicitly controlled for. According to Strahan (1999) , loan price summarizes any risks that cannot be addressed by other loan terms. If lenders on average price the loan correctly, the AIDS should be a sufficient statistic for the combined firm's post-transaction performance. We, therefore, expect β to be significantly negative.
We measure post-completion performance using four variables, namely, the combined firm's buy-and-hold return over the three years after deal completion (HPR36), the combined firm's buy-and-hold-abnormal return relative to the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio return (including distribution) (BHAR36) measured over the three years post-completion, the combined firm's return on assets (ROA), and the combined firm's ROA adjusted by industry median in each year (Adj. ROA). 9 The ROAs and adjusted ROAs are also measured over the three years before the deal announcement or after the deal completion. The HP R36
and BHAR36 are based on stock market data, and the ROA and Adj.ROA are based on financial-statement data. In all the equations in Table 7 , we find the loan price variable ln(AIDS) have negative coefficients, and all coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% level or above. For example, in column 8, the coefficient on ln(AIDS) is −0.024 and significant at the 1% level, which suggests that a one-standard-deviation increase in AIDS leads to a 1.44 percentage point decrease in the combined firm's adjusted ROA in the three years post-transaction. In a nut shell, the results that the loan price significantly predicts the combined firm's post-transaction indicate that lenders price the loan correctly on average.
Broadly, these results are consistent with the view that lenders have information advantage about the borrowers as is postulated by Diamond (1984) and Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003) .
Conclusive Remarks
Financing cost is a primary consideration in M&A transactions because it impacts M&A gains directly. Previous literature has studied the determinants of debt financing likelihood in M&As (Martynova and Renneboog, 2009 ) and how the use of debt financing impacts M&A performance (Bharadwaj and Shivdasani, 2003; Schlingemann, 2004) . In this paper,
we specifically study loan price in M&A transactions. We find that the relative deal size has a significant and robust positive effect on loan price. This positive effect is consistent with the notion that greater deal complexity and information risk associated with large transactions (e.g., Alexandridis et al., 2013; Datta, 1991; Faccio and Masulis, 2005; Hansen, 1987) . We also find higher loan price is associated with poorer post-transaction performance, which demonstrates that the loan price correctly incorporates the information on the quality of acquisitions.
Our study also demonstrates that the characteristics of major corporate investment projects can affect loan price significantly. We are not aware of another study from the extant literature that examines loan price or non-price terms in the context of major corporate investment such as M&A transactions. Previous studies have emphasized the importance of relationship lending, relationship syndication, borrowers' organizational structure, and accounting quality in determining loan prices (Aivazian et al., 2015; Bharath et al., 2011; Boot, 2000; Ivashina, 2009; Ivashina and Kovner, 2011, among others) . These studies assume the funded projects are homogeneous. We contribute to the literature by showing that the variation in the characteristics of large corporate investments impact loan price significantly. This table reports the summary statistics of variables used in our analysis. p5, p25, p75, and p95 denote the 5th, 25th, 75th, and 95th percentile, respectively. The variables are defined in the appendix. Table A1 . Industry fixed effects are controlled for at the 2-digit SIC level, and year fixed effects are included according to the year of M&A announcement. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively. This table reports the estimates of both OLS and SUR model in terms of additionally controlled variables of interests, using M&A transaction level data. The dependent variable in all columns is the natural logarithm of AIDS. The sample size varies because of the data availability in calculating the additional control variables. Industry fixed effects are controlled for at the 2-digit SIC level, and year fixed effects are included according to the year of M&A announcement. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively. This table reports the OLS estimates of the regressions of ex post performance measures on loan price. HPR36 is the holding period return (HPR) measured in the 36 months subsequent to the completion of the M&As. BHAR36 is buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) measured in the 36 months subsequent to the completion of the M&As (the estimates from the regressions of HPR and BHAR in the subsequent 60 months are qualitatively the same, not reported but available upon request). Dependent variables ROA in column (5) and (7) is the ROA averaged over the 3 years subsequent to the deal completion. Adj. ROA in column (6) and (8) "AIDS" refer to the "weighted average of AIDS". "arithmatic average AIDS" for arithmatic average.
Ln(AIDS)
The natural logarithm of AIDS.
Non-price loan terms
Maturity
The number of months of a loan facility's maturity. In M&A transaction level data, if a M&A is funded by multiple loan facilities, we take the average value of the maturities.
Ln(Maturity)
The natural logarithm of Maturity.
Collateral A dummy variable equals 1 when a facility used for a M&A is required to provide collateral, 0 otherwise. In M&A transaction level data, if a M&A is funded by multiple loan facilities, the dummy equals 1 as long as one of the facilities is required to provide collateral, 0 otherwise.
Size of M&A transactions
Relative deal size The ratio of M&A transaction value to the acquiring firm's market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year before M&A announcement. Tender offer A dummy variable equals 1 if the transaction is a tender offer, 0 otherwise.
Characteristics of M&A transactions
Characteristics of acquiring firms
Total assets
The acquiring firm's book value of total assets at the end of fiscal year prior to the announcement of the M&A (in million dollars).
Ln(Total assets)
The natural logarithm of total assets.
Market-to-book ratio An acquiring firm's ratio of the sum of market value of equity and the book value of liabilities to book value of total assets at the end of fiscal year prior to the announcement of the M&A.
Tangibility ratio
Acquiring firm's ratio of PPE to total assets at the end of fiscal year prior to the announcement of the M&A.
Altman Z-Score Acquiring firm's Altman Z-Score at the end of fiscal year prior to the announcement of the M&A. Altman Z-Score = 1.2 × working capital/total assets + 1.4 × (retained earnings/total assets) + 3.3 × (earnings before interest and tax/total assets) + 0.6 × (market value of equity/total liabilities) + 1.0 × (sales/total assets).
Credit rating score An index ranging from 1 to 7, representing AAA (1), AA (2), A (3), BBB (4), BB (5), below BB (6) and no rating (7), respectively.
Leverage Acquiring firm's ratio of the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to the book value of total assets at the end of fiscal year prior to the announcement of the M&A.
∆Leverage The difference of leverages between the value at the end of fiscal year prior to the M&A announcement and at the end of fiscal year after the M&A announcement.
Characteristics of loan contracts
Facility amount
The value of a loan facility amount in million dollars. In M&A transaction level data, if a M&A is funded by multiple loan facilities, it takes the average value of the amount of facilities.
Ln(Facility amount)
The natural logarithm of facility amount.
Facility amount/total assets The ratio of loan facility amount to the acquring firm's total assets at the end of fiscal year prior to the announcement of the M&A. 
Extra control variables
EBITDA/Sales Acquiring firm's ratio of EBITDA to sales at the end of fiscal year prior to the announcement of the M&A.
Current ratio Acquiring firm's ratio of cash and other assets that are expected to be realized in next 12 months or used in the production of revenue to total current liabilities at the end of fiscal year prior to the announcement of the M&A.
Ln(Interest coverage)
The natural logarithm of (1 + EBITDA/interest expenses) of the acquiring firm at the end of fiscal year prior to the announcement of the M&A.
Total assets maturity
The weighted average of maturity of current assets and Net PPE. Total assets maturity = current assets/(current assets + net PPE) × current assets/cost of goods sold + net PPE/(current assets + net PPE) × net PPE/Depreciation.
Ln(Total assets maturity)
The natural logarithm of total assets maturity. Offer premium The ratio of transaction value to the sum of market value (6 weeks before acquisition announcement) and total liability of the target firm.
Acquirer's ex ante stock volatility Acquiring firm's 24-month monthly return volatility prior to the announcement of the M&A. Appendix II, Predicting the probability of loan financing in M&A transactions (Heckman first stage)
E-index
In the first stage of the Heckman procedure reported in Table 5 , we estimate the probability of loan financing using a probit model. There is a rich set of theoretical and empirical work guiding our estimation. We are not the first one to empirically model the sources of finance in M&A transactions. Martynova and Renneboog (2009) We explain the rationale to include the following determinants and present the detailed results of these variables in Table A1 The first set of determinants are firm characteristics related to risk, information or agency issues. The pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) postulates that companies prefer internal funds to external ones because internal funds involve lower adverse selection costs. Therefore, whenever possible, an acquirer prefers to use internal funds. This implies that acquirer's internal cash flow scaled by the transaction value should negatively impact the use of loan. Previous literature has highlighted a firm's asset tangibility as a measure of debt capacity (Frank and Goyal, 2009 ). Tangible assets can be set aside as collaterals to secure loans, increasing the probability of loan financing. We, therefore, use the tangible assets in proportion to total assets as a measure of debt capacity.
Martynova and Renneboog (2009) also use another variable as a proxy for debt capacity, which is calculated as (long-term debt + transaction value)/Total assets at the end of fiscal year prior to the announcement of the M&As. We include this variable in our regression too.
A strand of literature demonstrates that overvalued firms tend to use their stocks to acquire less overvalued targets (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) .
We expect overvalued acquirers less likely to use loan when they can time the stock market.
We measure the degree of overvaluation by the pre-acquisition acquire stock-price run-up.
Moreover, the agency problem of debt overhang (Myers, 1977) also renders the lenders more reluctant to provide credit. A manager working for the best interest of shareholders may under-invest if a new project only makes the outstanding debt safer instead of benefiting the shareholders. Such a debt overhang problem is especially relevant for high-growth firms.
Therefore, we use the market-to-book ratio of assets to measure the severity of the debt overhang problem. Strahan (1999) posits that lenders are less willing to supply credit when a potential borrower is riskier. To reflect this effect, we use the acquirer's pre-transaction market beta and the acquirer's age as proxies for firm risk. We expect these risk measures 40 to harm the likelihood of loan financing. The acquiring firm's size may bear on the choice of loan finance too because larger firms often have access to a myriad of financing sources, for example, large firms usually have access to the bond market while small and medium-sized firms tend to rely on loan financing (Strahan, 1999) . Consequently, we expect larger acquirers to rely less on loan financing. Meanwhile, larger firms usually have greater debt capacity, which may well increase the use of loan. Therefore, the effect of firm size has two folds.
We use the amount of total assets to measure firm size. A strand of literature shows that managers can take more debt either to entrench themselves by making the firm more difficult to takeover (Harris and Raviv, 1988; Stulz, 1988; Zwiebel, 1996) or to commit themselves to good performance and make a takeover less attractive to potential bidders (because the marginal gain of replacing the current management will be reduced.) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Safieddine and Titman, 1999 Apart from firm characteristics, transaction characteristics may also influence the choice of loan financing. Larger transactions often rely on external financing more because internal cash is insufficient. Meanwhile, larger transactions involve greater risks and information asymmetry (Ahern, 2010; Alexandridis et al., 2013; Datta, 1991; Faccio and Masulis, 2005; Hansen, 1987; Shrivastava, 1986) , which make it more difficult to issue public debt and public equity. Therefore, how relative deal size impacts the probability of loan financing is an empirical question. Acquiring a target in a different industry may involve more risks because of the lack of experience with the new business line. However, the diversification into a different industry may also reduce risk exposure to specific industries because cash flows are not perfectly correlated across industries (Roll, 1988) . Therefore, how diversifying acquisitions impact loan finance is an empirical question. A cross-border deal often involves a high level of risk because of uncertainties associated with politics, policies, economics, and culture in a different country. Lenders are often reluctant to extend credits across country borders. Therefore, we expect cross-border deals to be less likely to use loan financing. The target firm's public status may also influence the likelihood of loan finance because private targets are more opaque than public ones and have greater informational risk (Officer et al., 2008) . We add a dummy variable indicating public target in our regression. Hostile deals are often related to the removal of inefficient managers while friendly deals related to strategic synergies. Their implications on performance are hardly distinguishable; however, according to Schwert (2000) . We include a dummy variable indication hostile deals in our regression analysis but do not expect it to have a significant impact on loan finance. Previous literature also finds tender offers and subsidiary acquisitions are related to superior performance (Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000; Agrawal et al., 1992; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001 ). Since better performance improves loan quality and encourages lending, we expect subsidiary targets and tender offers to be associated with a high likelihood of loan financing.
In Table A1 , we report the estimates of the probability of loan financing (i.e.,the first stage results of the Heckman procedure in Table 5 ). Consistent with the pecking order theory Myers and Majluf (1984) , the coefficient on Cash flow/Transaction value is −0.068 and statistically significant at the 1% level. The greater the internal cash flow relative to transaction value, the less likely the acquirer borrowing externally. Unlike what Frank and Goyal (2009) posit, we don't find a significant coefficient (z = 1.44) on the asset tangibility ratio, although the sign is as predicted (0.289). The variable (long-term debt + transaction value)/total assets has a positive coefficient (0.069) and significant at the 5% level, which suggests that an acquirer with greater debt capacity tends to use more loans to finance a transaction. Consistent with the market-timing hypothesis, the acquirer's pre-transaction stock price run-up has a negative and marginally significant coefficient (−0.234), suggesting overvalued acquirers rely more on external equity than loan. The acquirer's market-tobook ratio has a significantly (at the 1% level) negative coefficient (−0.070), consistent with the view under the debt overhang problem of Myers (1977) that high growth firms reduce loan financing to avoid the under investment problem. The acquirer pre-transaction market beta (Beta [−300, −60]) has a negative coefficient of −0.239 which is significant at the 1% level (z = −4.66), in line with the view that lenders are more reluctant to supply credit to risker firms Strahan (1999) . The other risk measure, age, is insignificantly associated with raising loans. The coefficient on the acquiring firm's size (measured by ln(T otalAssets)) is significantly (z = −4.19) negative at −0.089. At first sight, this may be counter-intuitive because larger firms usually have greater debt capacity. A second thought, however, indicates large firms also have access to other sources of finance and are not solely dependent on loans (Strahan, 1999) . The institutional ownership concentration negatively and significantly impacts the likelihood of loan financing. The coefficient is −1.478 and significant at the 1% level, indicating higher institutional ownership concentration either constraints the entrenchment effect of debt (Harris and Raviv, 1988; Stulz, 1988; Zwiebel, 1996) or substitute for the commitment effect of debt (Jensen, 1986; Safieddine and Titman, 1999 ).
Turning to the deal characteristics, we find the relative deal size has a significant positive effect on loan financing. The coefficient is 0.103 (z = 2.29), suggesting that, when internal cash is likely to be insufficient for large deals, the acquirers resort to external fund from loan financing. A deal that diversifies into another industry does not involve significantly different likelihood of loan financing. This can be due to the argument we made earlier that, although businesses in a new industry involve more uncertainties, the diversification effect (Roll, 1988) reduces risk simultaneously. The coefficient on the cross-border dummy is significantly (z = −3.34) negative at −0.263. This result suggests that although crossborder acquisitions may have some international diversification effect, what dominates is the higher risk involved in conducting business in a different country. Consequently, it is harder to obtain loans from lenders. The coefficient on the public target dummy is statistically insignificant, contrary to the view that public targets involves lower informational risk (Officer et al., 2008) which enhances loan financing. The coefficient on the hostile deal dummy is statistically insignificant, in line with the argument of Schwert (2000) that hostile deals are indistinguishable from friendly ones in terms of value implication. The subsidiary-target dummy has a significantly (z = 2.67) positive coefficient of 0.224. The tender offer dummy has a coefficient of 0.781 and statistically significant at the 1% level (z = 9.63). These evidence are in line with the thought that asset acquisitions and tender offers are value enhancing, which in turn enhances the acquirers' capability of access loan financing.
Altogether, we find the prediction of loan-financing probability are largely in line with the previous literature regarding information asymmetry and agency costs. 
